Referential Fallacy
Reification · Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness · Hypostatization
Assuming all words refer to existing things and that the meaning of words reside within the things they refer to.
Origin
The error has ancient roots, but Alfred North Whitehead gave it a formal name in 1925 — the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" — in Science and the Modern World. American philosopher Morris Raphael Cohen extended the critique in his 1931 book Reason and Nature, calling it the "fallacy of reification" and arguing that much philosophical confusion stems from treating logical relations as if they were real entities.
Everyday Use
Just because we have a word for "luck" doesn't mean luck is a tangible force. We do this constantly — talking about "the economy" as if it has feelings, or treating "common sense" as a real thing everyone possesses equally. Language makes abstractions feel concrete, and that tricks us into arguing about them as if they're objects.